Extending the Surveillance Horizon for Improved Ship Self-Defense Against Hypersonic Cruise Missiles

Navy ships face a variety of missile threats. Highly advanced and very capable ship selfdefense systems are in place to defeat these threats. However, hypersonic cruise missile threats operating at lower altitudes pose a unique challenge. As opposed to ballistic missile trajectories where Navy guided missile destroyers and cruisers have on the order of several minutes to detect, track, lock onto, and then launch interceptors against a hypersonic reentry vehicle, low flying missiles [Refs 1–3] provide as little as 10 seconds (s) of flight time above the ship’s radar horizon before missile impact. Some supersonic missile threats present similar challenges. An airborne platform, either manned or unmanned, with a suitable radar system operating in the vicinity of the ship could—in principle—dramatically extend the engagement timeline by providing early detection, tracking, and cueing to the ship. The most obvious candidate aircraft to host the radar system would be on high altitude long-endurance (HALE) and medium-altitude longendurance (MALE) unmanned aircraft (UA). Hosting this desired capability on existing Navy airborne radar systems is very desirable and worthy of consideration. Even when a threat vector is identified so as to constrain the radar surveillance volume, the detection and tracking timeline for single or multiple inbound missiles whose radar return may be buried within a plasma envelope is extremely challenging. The desired solution is a radar mode and signal processing approach capable of being hosted in modern Navy airborne radar systems. Work produced in Phase II may become classified. Note: The prospective contractor(s) must be U.S. owned and operated with no foreign influence as defined by DoD 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, unless acceptable mitigating procedures can and have been implemented and approved by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) formerly Defense Security Service (DSS). The selected contractor must be able to acquire and maintain a secret level facility and Personnel Security Clearances. This will allow contractor personnel to perform on advanced phases of this project as set forth by DCSA and NAVAIR in order to gain access to classified information pertaining to the national defense of the United States and its allies; this will be an inherent requirement. The selected company will be required to safeguard classified material IAW DoD 5220.22-M during the advanced phases of this contract.